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11 Introduction
Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents
choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. Consider, for example,
a single stock of an exhaustible or reproductive resource that is simultaneously exploited by several agents
that do not cooperate. Each agent chooses an extraction strategy to maximize the discounted stream of
future utility. The actions taken by agents not only determine their levels of utility but also the level of the
capital stock. Alternatively, look at the problem that agents voluntarily contribute to a single public stock of
capital, like a park or a church. They choose their contributions (investments in the public stock of capital) to
maximize the discounted stream of utility from consuming the public stock net of investment costs. Private
investment builds up the public stock of capital that eventually can be consumed by all agents.
Both examples have several things in common. First, the actions taken by agents determine the size of a
single capital stock that fully describes the current state of the economic system. Second, in case there
is no mechanism that forces players to coordinate their actions, they will act strategically and play a non-
cooperative game. Third, the equilibrium outcome will critically depend on the strategy spaces available to
the agents.
We make use of these features and formulate a differential game in which agents act non-cooperatively and
use Markov strategies. We provide a detailed analysis of Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MNPE) for this
class of differential games with a single capital stock and discuss several economic examples that belong to
this class.
In a differential game, strategically interacting agents try to maximize an inter-temporal objective function,
by choosing a strategy that results in an action at every point in time.1 Collectively, these actions inﬂuence
the state of the economic system and how it evolves over time. The evolution of the system as a result of the
agents’ strategies is captured in the system dynamics.
There is a wide choice of possible strategies taken by the agents. They may choose a simple time proﬁle
of actions and precommit themselves to these ﬁxed actions over the entire planning horizon. In that case
players are using open-loop strategies. Alternatively players might choose Markov strategies. In this case
they condition their actions on the current state of the system and react immediately every time the state
variable changes. When agents use feedback or Markov strategies they are not required to precommit.
Instead they play credible strategies if they are derive through backward induction.
To better understand the difference between open-loop and Markov strategies let us look at the following
example of several agents strategically exploiting the same renewable resource. In case the ﬁsheries use
open-loop strategies they specify a time path of ﬁshing effort at the beginning of the game and commit
themselves to stick to these preannounced actions over the entire planning horizon. If alternatively they use
Markov or feedback strategies they choose decision rules that determine current actions as a function of the
current stock of the resource. Markov decision rules capture the strategic interactions present in a dynamic
game. If the rival ﬁshery makes a catch today that necessarily results in a lower level of the ﬁsh stock,
the opponent reacts with an action that takes this change in the stock into account. In that sense Markov
strategies capture all the features of strategic interactions.
Assuming that agents use Markov strategy spaces we restrict our attention to the derivation of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria. These strategies have the property that a player knowing the strategies of the other
1For a general introduction to the theory of differential games we refer the reader to [9].
2players cannot gain by unilaterally deviating from his equilibrium strategy. Finding Markov Nash equi-
librium strategies of differential games, even if the game is of the linear-quadratic type, is a formidable
analytical problem. For instance, to ﬁnd a MPNE in the general case of n players and m state variables
leads to the problem of determining solutions of a system of n coupled nonlinear implicit m-dimensional
partial differential equations (PDE). Only in the case that the economic system can be described by a single
state variable (a single capital stock) will the system of PDE’s collapse to a system of ordinary differen-
tial equations that is much easier to deal with. Because of this, the article focusses on the least complex
case m = 1. As it turns out there are many economic problems that result in a dynamic game with a single
capital stock.
Consider the case of n agents non-cooperatively exploiting a single exhaustible or renewable resource. The
resource stock is the single state variable and agents choose extraction strategies to maximize the present
valueofutilityoveragivenplanninghorizon. Markovperfectequilibriafortheseclassesofgameshavebeen
studied, for example, by Levhari and Mirman [16], Sundaram [20], Benhabib and Radner [2], Clemhout and
Wan [5], Dutta and Sundaram [12], Dockner and Sorger [8], Rincon-Zapatero et al. [19] and more recently
Benchekroun [1].
As a second class of models consider the private investment in a public capital stock. The capital stock is
the single state variable and agents choose investment strategies to maximize the present value of future net
utility. Utility is derived from the available stock of public capital. This problem of private investment in a
single public capital stock has been formulated by Fershtman and Nitzan [14] and MPNE been studied by
Wirl [22], and in a discrete time framework by Marx and Matthews [18] and Dockner and Nishimura [11].
Dynamic games with a single capital stock can also be applied to study transboundary pollution control.
The emissions of two or more countries accumulate a single stock of pollution. Countries derive utility from
consumption but production results in emissions that accumulate and generate costs. Markov equilibria
for these types of games have been studied by Dockner and Long [10] and Dockner et al. [7]. Finally,
environmental economists have recently started to explore equilibria in the shallow lake problem. This
problem is structurally similar to the exploitation of a single renewable resource stock but with a non-
concave production function. Recent papers dealing with the shallow lake problem include Brock and
Starrett [4], M¨ aler et al. [15], and Wagener [21].
In this paper we formulate a class of differential games in which the actions of the agents inﬂuence a single
capital stock, the state variable, and develop a solution methodology, whose core is formed by necessary
conditions that have to be satisﬁed by Markov strategies. For the n-player case, an n-dimensional system
of explicit ordinary non-autonomous differential equations is found, which has to be satisﬁed by Markov
strategies at all points for which they are continuously differentiable. Moreover, necessary conditions are
given for possible failures of differentiability and continuity of the Markov equilibrium strategies. Points
where the Markov strategies are continuous but not differentiable can very conveniently be described by
singularities of an autonomous auxiliary (n + 1)-dimensional vector ﬁeld, whose solution trajectories are
the graphs of the equilibrium strategies. In the important special case that all players have the same utility
functionals, it is useful to focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all agents play the same strategy. The
symmetric equilibrium is the solution of an ordinary non-autonomous differential equation. In this case, it
is possible to draw the associated two-dimensional auxiliary vector ﬁeld, which yields detailed information
about the qualitative properties of the symmetric Markov equilibrium.
The approach of using an auxiliary system of differential equations to characterize Markov equilibria has
also been used by Rincon-Zapatero et al. [19] and Xepapadeas and co-workers [17, 23]. Contrary to
our approach, however, these authors derive sufﬁcient conditions and do not deal with the problems of
3differentiability and continuity of equilibrium strategies. Being able to deal with non-differentiable and
discontinuous equilibrium strategies in a systematic manner is very important and ﬁlls a gap in the literature
of economic applications of differential games.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, necessary conditions are derived which have to hold at
points where a Markov strategy is differentiable, or continuous, or discontinuous, respectively. Section 3
illustrates these conditions by determining Markov equilibria for different applications of differential games
with a single capital stock: (i) extraction of exhaustible resources; (ii) voluntary provision of public goods;
(iii) management of an economical-ecological system, known as the shallow lake system; and (iv) exploita-
tion of renewable resources. Section 4 concludes.
2 Markov strategies
In this section we formulate a differential game in which n-players choose Markov strategies, ui(x), to
maximize an inter-temporal objective function. The strategies determine the level of a single capital stock,
x, that is governed by the state dynamics. For this game we derive necessary conditions for a Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Recall that such an equilibrium is by deﬁnition a vector–valued function u : X ! Rn, such that if the
strategies of all players except player i are given by the component functions uj(x), j 6= i, then ui(x)
would be the optimal feedback control for player i of the resulting optimal control problem.
2.1 Basic idea. The basic idea for obtaining the necessary conditions for a MPNE can be described as





Here x 2 X, where X is an open subinterval of the real line R, and u denotes the vector u = (u1;¢¢¢ ;un) 2
Rn of the strategies of the players. For known u, the state equation
_ x = f(x;u)
determines the evolution of the system.
Given the strategies of the other players in feedback form, the Pontryagin necessary conditions yield an
autonomous system of differential equations for the best response strategy of player i; let this system be
solved by functions (x(t);ui(t)). Since the state space is one-dimensional, the map t 7! x(t) can be seen
as a variable transformation locally at some value t = t0 if _ x(t0) 6= 0. Using the inverse t = t(x) of this
transformation, weobtainfromthepair(x(t);u(t))astrategyinfeedback(Markov)form:ui(x) = ui(t(x)).
Using this basic idea, an explicit system of ordinary differential equations will be derived for the ui(x),
which is necessarily satisﬁed by Markov strategies at points where they are simultaneously continuously
differentiable.
This condition leads naturally to the question of what can be said about points where the continuous dif-
ferentiability fails to hold: such points are investigated in subsections 2.4 and 2.6, where the respective
possibilities of discontinuities in the ﬁrst derivative of the control function, and in the control itself are
investigated.
42.2 The associated control problem. For ease of notation, it is assumed that the strategies of players 1
to n¡1 are ﬁxed, leaving player n to solve for his optimal response. Let ^ u = ^ u(x) = (u1(x);¢¢¢ ;un¡1(x))




Ln(x; ^ u(x);un)e¡½nt dt; (1)
under the constraint that
_ x = f(x; ^ u(x);un); x(0) = x0: (2)
The functions Lj, j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n and f are assumed to be sufﬁciently many times continuously differentiable.
Introduce the Pontryagin function2 Pn of player n’s optimal control problem
Pn(x;pn; ^ u;un) = ¡Ln(x; ^ u;un) + pnf(x; ^ u;un);
with pn as the costate variable. Pontryagin’s minimal principle requires that Pn(x;pn;U) takes a minimum
for U = un. If it is assumed that for given x the function ^ u(x) is continuously differentiable, and that the




Note that from this equation, the co–state pn can be solved as a function pn = qn(x; ^ u;un). Inversely, if the
condition is imposed that Pn is (locally) strictly convex in un for all x, ^ u and pn, then the control un can be
solved smoothly from equation (3) as a function un = vn(x; ^ u;pn).
More generally, we may consider the case that the control variable un is constrained to some set S. As this
case is not our main concern, we shall comment on it brieﬂy and we will not try to achieve utmost generality
of our results in this direction. In particular, we shall assume that the set S is given as
S = Sx;^ u = fun jhn(x; ^ u;u) · 0g;
and that on the boundary of S (i.e. for hn = 0) the derivative @hn=@un does not vanish. The necessary






; ¹nhn = 0; ¹n ¸ 0; hn · 0:
Imposing strict convexity of Pn and quasi-convexity of hn with respect to un, we can again solve uniquely
the control un from the necessary conditions, together with the multiplier ¹n, but now only as a continuous
function vn(x; ^ u;pn). However, the discontinuities in the derivatives of vn occurr only for those values of pn
for which both hn = 0 and ¹n = 0.
Introduce the (minimized) Hamiltonian
Hn(x;pn) = Pn
³
x;pn; ^ u(x);vn(x; ^ u(x);pn)
´
;








2This function is usually called the Hamilton function in the optimal control literature; however, we like to reserve that name
for the function Hn introduced below, also called the ‘minimized Hamilton function’, which depends only on states and co-states.
5See [3] for more details on Pontryagin necessary conditions.





Ln(x(t); ^ u(x(t));un(t))e¡½nt dt:










dx (x(t)) = pn(t), this could also be written as ½nVn = ¡Hn(x;pn).
2.3 Derivation of necessary conditions. From the preceding subsection it is clear that each individual
player has to solve an optimal control problem given the Markov strategies of the rivals. Hence, we can
make use of the system (4) to derive necessary conditions for a stationary Markov equilibrium.
THEOREM 1. Let u(x) = (u1(x);¢¢¢ ;un(x)) be Markov Nash equilibrium strategies of the differential
game with payoffs (1) and state equation (2). Moreover, let vi satisfy equation (3) with n replaced by i.
If u(x) is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of a point x0 = x(t0) such that f(x0;u(x0)) 6= 0,






























evaluated at pi = qi(x;u1;¢¢¢ ;un) for all i, are satisﬁed at t0, for every i 2 f1;:::;ng.
Proof
Writing the equation for _ pn in full (see equation (4)) and using equation (3) to simplify yields

















Note that expressions like @Ln=@^ u ¢ d^ u=dx are shorthand for
Pn¡1
j=1 @Ln=@^ uj ¢ d^ uj=dx.
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, if x0(t) 6= 0, then x(t) can be seen as a local coordinate
transformation. In order not to burden notation too much, both ^ u(x) and ^ u(x(t)) shall be denoted by ^ u; the














This implies for the _ pn–equation that









































































































Of course, the label n is by no means special; hence for every uj an equation of the form (7) can be obtained.
Put together, a system of equations linear in the _ uj is obtained, which can be solved (under appropriate
determinant conditions) to yield a system of (nonlinear) ordinary differential equations for the uj. Changing
to dun=dx using the chain rule yields the result.
2.4 Corner points. Equation (5) also answers the question of when a continuous equilibrium Markov
strategy u(x) may fail to be differentiable at certain (isolated) points.
Introduce the square matrix A(x) = (aij(x;u))n
ij=1 with elements aii = f(x;u) and aij(x;u) = @vi=@pi ¢
@Pi=@uj if i 6= j as well as the vector b(x) = @vi
@x f + @vi
@pi(½ipi ¡ @Pi
@x ). Based on these we are able to show
our next result.
THEOREM 2. Assume that u = u(x) is a Markov Nash equilibrium strategy of the differential game
with payoffs (1) and state equation (2), that u is continuous in a neighborhood U of x0 and continuously
differentiable in Unfx0g, and that A(x0;u(x0)) is invertible. Then u is differentiable at x0.
Proof




(x) = b(x;u(x)): (8)
If A(x;u(x)) is invertible, this can be rewritten as
du
dx
(x) = A(x;u(x))¡1b(x;u(x)) = F(x):
Read differently, if the vector ﬁeld F(x) exists it gives for every x the only possible value for du=dx.
Hence, let x0 be a point such that the left and right limits of du=dx exist as x tends to x0, then there are the
following two possibilities. Either F(x0) exists, it is the limit of du=dx, and u is continuously differentiable
at x0. Or F(x0) fails to exist; but this can happen only if A(x) fails to be invertible at x0.
2.5 Auxiliary system. Another way to understand the occurrence of corner points is to consider what
will be called the auxiliary system to the system given by equation (8).
Recall the deﬁnition of the adjoint matrix A¤ of a given matrix A: it is the matrix whose elements are the
cofactors of A, which are obtained by deleting the i’th row and j’th column of A and taking the determinant
7of the remaining matrix. We have that AA¤ = (detA)I, where I is the identity matrix; hence A¡1 =







Now consider the system of differential equations
½
~ u0 = A¤(~ x; ~ u)b(~ x; ~ u);
~ x0 = detA(~ x; ~ u);
(10)
here ~ u0 is differentiation with respect to some real parameter s.3 By the chain rule, it follows that whenever
~ x0 6= 0, then du
dx(~ x(s)) = ~ u0(s)=~ x0(s). Hence if (~ x(s); ~ u(s)) are solution curves of the auxiliary system,
and if for s = s0 we have that ~ x0(s0) 6= 0, then the equation ~ x(s) = x can be solved for s = s(x), and in a
neighborhood of x(s0) the function ~ u(s(x)) yields a solution of (8). The system given by equation (10) is
an auxiliary system to equation (9).
More generally, a system u0 = k(x;u), x0 = h(x;u), with k(x;u) 2 Rn and h(x;u) 2 R, is an auxiliary




2.6 Jump points Note that theorem 1 yields a necessary condition at points where the equilibrium strate-
gies are continuously differentiable. Here, we look for necessary conditions that have to hold if the equilib-
rium strategy has an isolated jump discontinuity.
Let p(x) = (p1(x);¢¢¢ ;pn(x)) = (q1(x;u(x));¢¢¢ ;qn(x;u(x))), with qj(x;u) as introduced in subsec-
tion 2.2. The result can then be stated as follows.






for every x¤ 2 X and all j = 1;¢¢¢ ;n.
Proof
In the appendix we state the conditions that imply the continuity of the value functions Vi. Recall that the
value function of player i satisﬁes ½Vi(x) = ¡Hi(x;pi(x)). Given c = ¡½Vi(x), the only values possible
for pi are those for which
Hi(x;pi) = c:
The theorem follows from this.
3The relationship between the time derivative _ x =
dx


















1. The necessary condition stated in the Theorem cannot be used to identify the location of jump discon-
tinuities but imposes a restriction on the jump size.
2. If Hn is convex in pn, then there are at most two solutions to the equation Hn(x;pn) = c.
3. Let u(x) be deﬁned for all x < x¤, and assume that there is only one possibility for a nonzero jump
at x¤, to a continuous strategy ~ u(x) deﬁned for all x ¸ x¤. Let
lim
x"x¤
f(x;u(x)) = A; and lim
x#x¤
f(x; ~ u(x)) = f(x¤; ~ u(x¤)) = B:
If the time evolution x(t) is continuous and piecewise differentiable, then it is not possible that simul-
taneously A > 0 and B < 0. For, suppose it were the case. Then if x(t0) = x¤, necessarily x(t) = x¤
for all t > t0. Hence B should be equal to 0, contradicting the assumption.
3 Applications
The class of differential games introduced in the preceding section is fairly general and allows us to study
Markov equilibria for a variety of different examples. Here we apply the techniques of the auxiliary system
to four alternative models that have been dealt with in the literature: (i) the exploitation of an exhaustible
resource (see [13], [19], and [5]), (ii) the voluntary provision of a public capital good (see [14] and [22]),
(iii) the shallow lake problem (see [15], [21], and [4]) and (iv) the exploitation of a reproductive asset (see
[2], [8], and [1]).
3.1 Exploitation of exhaustible assets. Let x be the stock of some exhaustible resource, and let ui be





where Li(ui) is the instantaneous utility that exhibits positive and decreasing marginal utility. The stock
dynamics of the resource is described by




The function Pi is given by




yielding pi = ¡L0
i(ui) ´ ¡
dLi(ui)
dui if ui > 0, and pi = 0 if ui = 0. Restricting the analysis on symmetric
equilibria ui = u, equation (5) becomes











Based on equation (11) we can now characterize symmetric Markov equilibria for different types of utility
functions (see [19]). In particular we distinguish two different cases. One in which preferences exhibit
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and one in which consumers have preferences with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA).
























which is solved by either u(x) = 0, or, if n > 1=(1 ¡ ´), by the linear function
u(x) = Gx; where G =
½
(1 ¡ ´)n ¡ 1
:
This is the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy for all players; note that in equilibrium, the rate of extrac-
tion G is proportional to the discount rate, and it decreases with the number of players. In the limiting case
when agents have logarithmic utility, Li(ui) = lnui and the elasticity becomes E(u) = 1, extraction rates
are independent of the number of ﬁrms exploiting the resource. They are given by u(x) = ½x.
In case of constant absolute risk aversion, consumer preferences are given by
Li(ui) = ¡e¡®u





and equation (11) becomes µ











Under the assumptions that u(0) = 0 this equation can be integrated to yield equilibrium extraction rates
equal to
u(x) =
(n ¡ 1) +
p
(1 ¡ n)2 + 2½n®x
n®
:
These equilibrium strategies are decreasing both in the number of ﬁrms exploiting the resource and in the
level of absolute risk aversion.
103.2 Voluntary provision of a public good. Next we turn to the analysis of private investment in a public
capital stock. This game was ﬁrst looked at by Fershtman and Nitzan [14]. They assume that each agent
derives quadratic utility form the consumption of the public capital stock and in case he invests in the stock
faces quadratic costs. Fershtman and Nitzan solve both the open-loop game and the game with Markov
strategies and ﬁnd that the dynamic free rider problem is more severe when agents use linear Markov strate-
gies. Wirl[22]challengesthisresultsandstudiestheidenticallinearquadraticgamebutsolvesfornon-linear
Markov equilibria. He ﬁnds that if the discount rate is small enough non-linear Markov strategies can sup-
port equilibrium outcomes that are close to the efﬁcient provision of the public capital. Here we use this
example and demonstrate how our methodology can be used to replicate this results and extend them to
include discontinuous and non-differentiable strategies.
The game. Each player i voluntarily invests in the public capital stock at the rate ui. The single public





here ¾ > 0 is the constant depreciation rate. Following Fershtman and Nitzan we assume that player i’s















where a;b > 0 are positive parameters. Note that compared to the formulation of [22], one parameter has
















The function vi is found by minimizing Pi with respect to ui under the condition ui ¸ 0. This yields that
vi(pi) =
½
¡pi pi · 0;
0 pi > 0:







(½ + ¾)u ¡ a + bx
(2n ¡ 1)u ¡ ¾x
u(x) > 0
0 u(x) = 0
The corresponding auxiliary system is (in the region u > 0)
x0 = (2n ¡ 1)u ¡ ¾x;
u0 = (½ + ¾)u ¡ a + bx:
Some phase curves of the auxiliary system are shown in ﬁgure 1. In this ﬁgure solutions of the auxiliary
system are represented by drawn curves. They can, at least locally, be interpreted as the graphs of possible
symmetricfeedbackstrategiesu(x). Threecurvesarehighlighted: thestrategyu(x) = 0 atthelowerbound-
ary of the control region, which is a special solution. The other two are examples of a non–differentiable
and a non–continuous Markov strategy, respectively. The ﬁgure will be discussed in geometric terms.












Figure 1: Solutions of the auxiliary system (drawn) and level curves of the value function (dotted) in the
symmetric two player case of the voluntary provision of public goods game.
Stability of equilibria. First consider the line `1 : nu ¡ ¾x = 0 of equilibria of the state equation (the
broken line in the ﬁgure): the quantity _ x is positive above `1, and negative below. Let u(x) be a feedback










is satisﬁed. From the ﬁgure, it is readily apparent that points on `1 close to the origin (lower left hand corner)
are stable, while points on `1 in the upper right hand corner are unstable. Hence there is a point on `1 where
equilibria change from stable to unstable; it is the unique point where a solution curve of the auxilary system
touches the line `1.
Forbiddenregion. Notetheregioninthelowerrighthandcorner. Anysolutionoftheauxiliarysystemends
(under the dynamics of the state equation) on the line `2 : (2n¡1)u¡¾x = 0 (not drawn in the picture: it
is the line through the origin and the only steady state equilibrium P = (xP;uP) of the auxiliary system).
As this is coincidentally also the curve of maxima of the value function for given x, the strategies cannot
‘jump away’ from `2. Neither can they stay there, for none of the points on `, excepting the origin, is an
equilibrium of the state equation. Finally, continuation along solutions of the auxiliary system is impossible
as well, for as the trajectories bend back, they cannot be represented by functions of the state variable any
more.
Character of the strategies. This reasoning has to be modiﬁed slightly for the region in the lower left hand
corner: here points that start at the line `2 move away from it under state dynamics. Here solutions of the
auxiliary system represent feedback strategies; these strategies are however not deﬁned for all states.
12The feedback strategy which is formed by the upper two invariant manifolds of P (two thickly drawn half–
lines in the ﬁgure) is of the type mentioned in subsection 2.4. Note that the corner point is on the line `2, as
predicted. The corners of the strategies ending (or beginning) on the line u = 0 are of a different kind, since
on that line the function v(p) is non–differentiable.
The upper non–differentiable feedback strategy, as well as all continuous strategies above it are globally
deﬁned. The same holds for those in the region bounded by the lower two invariant manifolds of P, if we
continue them by setting u(x) = 0 after they hit the x–axis.
Jump points. Note the discontinuous strategy that ‘jumps’ over P (also thickly drawn in the ﬁgure). At
the jumping discontinuity, the players are indifferent between increasing or decreasing dynamics. This is
similar to a Skiba point in open loop dynamics (see [4, 6, 15, 21]).
3.3 Shallow lake. Consider the following environmental problem. There are n farmers each applying
fertilizer to his land. The amount of fertilizer used has two opposing effects. The more fertilizer a farmer
uses, the higher is his harvest and hence revenue from farming. On the other hand the amount of fertilizer
used eventually accumulates a stock of phosphorus in a shallow lake. The higher the phosphor level the
higher are costs (for fresh water, less tourists come to his camping) to the farmer. Since the level of the
phosphor stock is the result of activities of all farmers around the lake, the resulting problem can best be
described by a differential game. The shallow lake system has been investigated in detail by [6, 15, 21]; we
refer to these papers for background information.
Let the stock variable x represent the amount of phosphorus in a shallow lake and let ui be the amount of
fertilizer used by farmer i. Assuming a concave technology to produce farming output and quadratic costs




(logui ¡ cix2)e¡½t dt:
The level of phosphorus is assumed to evolve according to the following state equation:
_ x = f(x;u) =
n X
i=1




where we have a constant rate of self-puriﬁcation (sedimentation, outﬂow) and the nonlinear term x2=(x2 +
1) is the result of biological effects in the lake.




































Figure 2: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves of the value function (dotted) in the sym-
metric two player case of the shallow lake game. The highlighted curve is an example of a non-differentiable
feedback strategy.
If we restrict our attention to symmetric objective functionals ci = c it is possible to derive symmetric





f ¡ (n ¡ 1)u
µ












u ¡ bx + x2
x2+1




Solutions to the auxiliary system are given in ﬁgure 2. It is shown that the symmetric equilibrium includes
non-smooth strategies as well as multiple steady states.
Finally notice that the auxiliary system does not depend on the number of agents, and therefore coincides
with the state–control system of the shallow lake optimal control problem. The optimal control problem is
analyzed in detail in [21].
3.4 Exploitation of reproductive assets. As the ﬁnal example consider the problem where n agents
strategically exploit a single reproductive asset, like ﬁsh or other species (see [8]). The reproduction of the
stock x occurs at rate h(x), whereas player i extracts the stock at rate ui. Hence, the state dynamics is given
by




14Let us assume that the instantaneous utility that agent i derives from the consumption of the stock is given
by
Li(u1;¢¢¢ ;un)





This functional covers several cases. The ﬁsh catch can be sold in an imperfect output market. In that case
the price of the ﬁsh depends on the total quantity produced by all ﬁsheries and therefore the function Li(u)
depends on the extraction rates of all players. In case of a duopoly market with linear demand this problem
was studied in [1].
Alternatively, the function Li(u) can only depend on the exploitation rate of player i. In this case each
agents maximizes the present value of future utility derived from consuming the ﬁsh. This formulation was
dealt with in [8].
3.4.1 Duopoly. Let us start with the duopoly model studied by [1]. The number of players is assumed to
be two, n = 2, and the utility (revenue) functions are given by
Li(ui;uj) = (a ¡ b(ui + uj))ui:
Moreover, the production function is speciﬁed as
h(x) =
½
±x for x · xmax
2
±(xmax ¡ x) for x > xmax
2 :
It is assumed that marginal product is large enough to satisfy ± > maxf
5½
2 ; 10a
9b g. Hence, the production
function is piecewise linear and the utility function is quadratic. The function Pi is given by
Pi(x;pi;ui) = ¡aui + b(u2
i + uiuj) + pi (h(x) ¡ ui ¡ uj):
This yields that pi = qi(x;ui;uj) = ¡a + 2bui + buj(x), ui = vi(x;uj;pi) = (pi + a)=(2b) ¡ (1=2)uj












The corresponding auxiliary systems becomes
(









Given the assumption on the production function, marginal product is piecewise constant, i.e. h0(x) = ±




b±) and (u0 =
a
3b;x0 = 9b±¡5a
9b± ) are steady states.
Since the duopoly game is of the linear quadratic type, it makes sense to look for a linear Markov equilib-
rium. The linear equilibrium, however, cannot be applied for the entire state space. Whenever the stock











Figure 3: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves of the value function (dotted) in the
symmetric two player duopoly with production function h(x) = ± minfx;1 ¡ xg. Parameters are a = b =,
± = 2, ½ = 1=2. The highlighted curve is the piecewise linear solution described in the text.
level is large enough it is optimal for the ﬁrms to chose the steady state level u0 = a
3b and stay at this level.
Prior to reaching this upper steady state ﬁrms can choose linear Markov strategies. They can be derived
making use of (13). Let us assume that in the appropriate state space range strategies are linear, and that
there h(x) = ±x. This implies that du









































±¡½=2 , equilibrium production is zero. For levels above x2 = 5
9
a
b±, the optimal policy of the ﬁrms is to
choose u0 = a
3b. For intermediate levels it is optimal to choose the linear Markov strategy given by (15).
This equilibrium is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Note that the condition ± > 10a
9b ensures that x2 < 1=2.
163.4.2 Constant relative risk aversion. We now proceed with the case in which each agent has a constant





















From @Pi=@ui we obtain pi = ¡u¡¾

































The corresponding auxiliary system reads as
½
x0 = ¾h(x) + ((n ¡ 1) ¡ n¾)u;
u0 = u(h0(x) ¡ ½):
(18)













Compare equation (4) of [8].
Stability of steady states. For a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy u(x), it follows from equation (12)













From equations (19) and (17), we ﬁnd that















Figure 4: Solutions of the auxiliary system (solid) and level curves of the value function (dotted) in the
symmetric two player case of the ﬁshery model with production function h(x) = x(1 ¡ x).





and unstable if the inequality sign is reversed. In particular, if h0(x0) < 0, then (x0;u(x0)) is always an
unstable equilibrium for the state dynamics. Moreover, the derivative h0(x) is bounded from above, and
if ½ > 1=n ¢ maxh0(x), then the state dynamics do not have stable equilibria in the interior of the state
space.
Case study. In the following, we shall restrict our attention to the analysis of the special case with h(x) =
x(1 ¡ x) whenever illustrations are called for.
Local analysis of the auxiliary system. In the following, the auxiliary system is used to characterize the
functions u(x) for the case h(x) = x(1 ¡ x).











where x½ = (1¡½)=2 is the solution of h0(x)¡½ = 0. Note that the third equilibrium is in the quadrant x >
0, u > 0 only if ½ < 1 and n > 1=(1 ¡ ¾).
LEMMA 1. If (x;u(x)) is a solution of (17) that satisﬁes 0 < u(x) < (1=n)h(x), then the solu-
tion (x(t);u(x(t)) of the control problem of each player violates the transversality condition.
Proof
For an equilibrium (x0;u0) 2 E, introduce ³ = (»;´) = (x¡x0;u¡u0). The linearized system at (x0;u0)
then becomes
³0 = A³ =
µ
¾h0(x0) n(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1
u0h00(x0) h0(x0) ¡ ½
¶
³ + O(j³j2):
18Note that if x0 = 1, the matrix A takes the form
A =
µ
¡¾ n(1 ¡ ¾) ¡ 1
0 ¡1 ¡ ½
¶
We have the following lemma:












where C is an integration constant. This lemma yields that » = Cj´j
¾
1+½ +:::, and hence that the integral








The state dynamics at the equilibrium read as
d
dt







as (1 + ½)=¾ > 1, we have that »(t) = e¡t»0 + :::, and consequently u(t) = ´(t) = ´0 e¡
1+½
¾ t. Recalling
that p = ¡u¡¾, we ﬁnally obtain
p(t) = p0 e(1+½)t:
Hence for all solutions of the auxiliary system that tend to the equilibrium (x0;u0) = (1;0), the transver-
sality condition limt!1 p(t)e¡½t = 0 is violated.
Asymmetric strategies. Here the assumption is dropped that the players play symmetric strategies; for sim-
plicity, we restrict to the two–player case n = 2 and assume that 1 ¡ ¾ = 1=2 holds. Equation (16) gives
rise to the system










+ (h ¡ u1 ¡ u2)
du2
dx
= 2(h0 ¡ ½)u2:
It is convenient to consider instead of u1 and u2 the dependent quantities v = u1 ¡ u2 and w = u1 + u2;















with ¢(x) = h2 ¡ 2hw + v2. The auxiliary version of this system of equations is
x0 = ¢ = h2 ¡ 2hw + v2;
w0 = 2(h0 ¡ ½)
¡
hw ¡ 2w2 + v2¢
;
v0 = 2(h0 ¡ ½)(h ¡ w)v:
19Note that the plane v = 0, corresponding to the symmetric case u1 = u2, is invariant under the ﬂow of the
auxiliary system; in other words, that case is nested in the present one.
We will not give a full analysis of this system, leaving that to future work. However, we would like to point
out one consequence of the equation v0 = 2(h0 ¡ ½)(h ¡ w)v. Recall that x0 = h ¡ w; hence, if the system
is on a time path for which the stock decreases, the factor h ¡ w < 0, and the sign of v0=v is the opposite
of h0 ¡ ½.
In the example above, the factor h0¡½ is positive for small ½ and small x, and it follows that then the differ-
ences between strategies decay exponentially if the stock decreases towards an equilibrium close to x = 0.
Conversely, if ½ sufﬁciently large, differences between strategies increase exponentially, which can be seen
as a mad scramble to exploit the last remnants of the stock.
4 Conclusions
In this article, a framework has been elaborated to ﬁnd necessary conditions for Markov Nash equilibrium
strategies in differential games with a single state variable. The Nash equilibria have been characterized as
solutions of a system of explicit ﬁrst order ordinary differential equations, usually nonlinear.
By analyzing a series of classical examples, we have shown that this characterization can be used to ﬁnd
both direct analytic information, by integration of the equations, and indirect qualitative information, by a
geometric analysis of the solution curves of an auxiliary system in the phase space.
Additionally, we have addressed the issues of continuity and differentiability of Markov strategies in this
class of differential games. Our simple approach is capable enough to deliver interesting insights into a large
class of capital accumulation games.
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22Appendix
Theorem 3 uses the assumption that the value function for each player is continuous. Here we discuss
regularity conditions for the value function to be continuous within the framework of an optimal control





under the constraint that
_ x = f(x;u): (21)
Here x : [0;1) ! X and u : [0;1) ! U, with X an open subset of Rm and U the closure of an open
subset of Rk. We shall denote by D» the set of all such functions x and u that satisfy equation (21) almost
everywhere such that u is integrable, x absolutely continuous and x(0) = ».
Recall that the value function can be deﬁned as
V (») = sup
D»
J[x;u]:
Loosely speaking, a system is locally controllable if any point in the neighborhood of a given point can
be reached by choosing the control function u appropriately. The following deﬁnition makes this notion
precise.
DEFINITION. (Bounded controllability at a point) We shall call the system _ x = f(x;u) boundedly
controllable at x0, if for every ´ > 0 there is a ¾0 = ¾0(´) > 0 such that for every 0 < ¾ · ¾0, there an
open neighborhood U ½ X of x0, depending on ´ and ¾, such that the following holds.
If t1, t2 and x1;x2 2 U are such that jt1 ¡ t2j < ¾, there is an integrable function u : (t1;t2) ! U such
that ju(t)j < ´, and an absolutely continuous function x : (t1;t2) ! U, that satisfy x(t1) = x1, x(t2) = x2
and
_ x = f(x;u);
almost everywhere on (t1;t2).
With this deﬁnition in place, the criterion that ensures continuity of the value function takes now a rather
simple form.
THEOREM 4. If the system _ x = f(x;u) is boundedly controllable at », then the value function V is
continuous at ».
Proof
Take " > 0 arbitrarily. We show that there is a neighborhood U of » such that if ~ » 2 U, then V (») ¡ " <
V (~ ») < V (») + ".
By the deﬁnition of value function, we can ﬁnd (x1;u1) 2 D», such that





















Choose ¾ > 0 such that ¾ · minf¾0(´);¾1g.
Find an open neighborhood U ½ B± of » such that for every ~ » 2 U, there is an integrable function ~ u,
bounded by ´, and an absolutely continuous function ~ x, both deﬁned on (0;¾) such that _ ~ x = f(~ x; ~ u) almost
everywhere and ~ x(0) = ~ », ~ x(¾) = ».
We construct (x2;u2) 2 D~ » as follows:
x2(t) =
(
~ x(t) 0 · t < ¾;
x1(t ¡ ¾); t ¸ ¾:
u2(t) =
(
~ u(t); 0 · t < ¾;
u1(t ¡ ¾); t ¸ ¾:
It then follows that
V (~ ») ¸ J[x2;u2] =
Z ¾
0





x1(t ¡ ¾);u1(t ¡ ¾)
¢
e¡½t dt:
The summands can be estimated as
Z ¾
0








x1(t ¡ ¾);u1(t ¡ ¾)
¢
e¡½t dt






= V (») ¡
"
3








Adding these, we arrive at
V (~ ») > V (») ¡ ":
Completely analogously, we show that V (») > V (~ ») ¡ ". Combining these inequalities yields that
¡" < V (~ ») ¡ V (») < ":
This shows that V is continuous at ».
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